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**Continuity and Innovation: Television and New forms of
Conciliation in Brazilian Politics.**

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**A thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D
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Abstract

This is a single-case study that seeks to demonstrate the historical endurance of political conservatism in Brazilian society that has precluded both the possibility of radical social transformation and the full development of democracy. The basic argument pervading this dissertation is that from independence in 1822 to the New Republic in the 1990s, Brazilian history has been characterised by a liberal-conservative and capitalist hegemony which has avoided the 'evils of universal democracy'; the denial of which has precluded real political participation and social transformation.

The historical reproduction of political conservatism is variously demonstrated through an analysis of Brazilian political history, political culture, intellectual production, and political party proclamations using analytic categories drawn from discourse analysis, linguistic theory, communication theory, and post-modern deconstruction.

A post-structuralist analysis contributes to the understanding of Brazilian politics in terms of the infrastructural *iterability* and the logic of *hegemony*. These post-modern perspectives remove the positivist ground on which dichotomies separating good and evil notions liberal democracy rely, showing that systems of inclusion and exclusion operating in the hegemonic logic ensure the domination of Brazilian elites given the ambiguity they input to the concept of democracy. The latter retains authoritarian and populist connotations that impair radical democratic claims in Brazilian society.

In the post-modern perspective the Brazilian State and society are contingent structures articulated by external forces. I explain hegemonic articulations along patrimonial lines in terms of certain mechanisms of power through which traditional elites institute social relations that do not depend on any a priori rationality. I concentrate on the mass media whose force dwell on the symbolic power to erase and obscure the contradictions of the state and society, consolidating a *logocentric* order that guarantees the repetition of domination by traditional groups.

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I extend my special gratitude to Nicholas Cooper, my partner, who has lived with this thesis in the last and most difficult year, for giving me generous support. To my son Daniel and my parents, who were source of moral support, I wish to extend my deepest appreciation that goes to all those named above and plenty of whom are omitted. I hope that my work has done them credit.

Glossary of Abbreviations and Portuguese Terms

Arena	Aliança Renovadora Nacional (National Renovating Alliance)
Cabo eleitoral	Political ward boss
Cafe com leite	Political alliance between states of Minas Gerais and São Paulo during Old Republic
Camara municipal	Local council
Carioca	Resident of the city of Rio de Janeiro
Coronel, coroneis	Local political bosses
Coronelismo	Rule by local bosses
Cruzado	Brazilian unit of currency introduced in 1986
Cruzeiro	Brazilian unit of currency until 1986, and again in 1990
CUT	Central Unica dos Trabalhadores. Central labour union formed in 1983
DIAP	Departamento Intersindical de Assessoria Parlamentar. A labour lobby group.
ESG	Escola Superior de Guerra (Superior War College)
Estado Nôvo	New State. Vargas dictatorship
Fazenda	A large farm
Fazendeiro	A large landowner
Guanabara	Greater Rio de Janeiro city, formerly a separate state, incorporated into the state of Rio de Janeiro in 1974
Gaucho	Resident of the state of Rio Grande do Sul
HGPE	Horario Gratuito de propaganda Eleitoral. Free Air Time of Political Propaganda on Radio and TV
IBGE	Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. The official census and statistical institute.
IBOPE	Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Publica e Estatística. A private public opinion institute.
ICM	Imposto sobre a circulação de mercadorias. A value-added tax that is the main source of revenue for the states.
MDB	Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement). Opposition party, 1965-79
Mineiro	Resident of the state of Minas Gerais
município	The Brazilian municipality
Paulista	Resident of the state of São Paulo
Pcdob	Partido Comunista do Brazil (Brazilian Communist Party)
PDC	Partido Democrata Cristão (Christian Democratic Party)
PDS	Partido Democrático Social (Democratic Social Party). Progovernment party formed in 1979
PFL	Partido da Frente Liberal (Party of Liberal Front)

PL	Partido Liberal (Liberal Party)
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement). Formed in 1979.
PP	Partido Popular (Popular Party). Formed in 1982.
PRN	Partido de Reconstrução Nacional (Party of National Reconstruction). Formed by Fernando Collor de Mello in 1989.
PRONA	Partido da Reedificação da Ordem Nacional (Party of National Order Rebuilding)
PRP	Partido Republicano Paulista (São Paulo Republican Party)
PSB	Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party)
PSD	Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party). Pro-Vargas Party, 1945-65.
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy). Formed in 1988 as break with the PMDB.
PSP	Partido Social Progressista (Social Progressive Party), 1945-65.
PV	Partido Verde (Green Party)
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker's Party). Formed in 1979 after party reform.
PTB	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labour Party). Pro-Vargas party, 1945-64.
SNI	Serviço Nacional de Informações (National Information Service). The national military-run intelligence agency.
Tenente	Army lieutenant
Tenentismo movement	Tenente protest movement of the 1920s against the Old Republic
UDN	União Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Union). Anti-Vargas party, 1945-65.

Continuity and Innovation: New forms of Conciliation within Brazilian Politics.

Chronology: Brazilian History

	1808	Napoleon invades the Iberian Peninsula and the Portuguese royal family goes to Brazil, its colony.
	1822	D. Pedro I declares Brazil's independence from Portugal. Form of government continues to be an empire
	1889	Proclamation of Republic Forced abdication of the emperor D. Pedro II. A Republic is established.
1889-1930 Oligarchic Republic 'Old Republic'		Lose federation. Traditional, authoritarian 'coffee with milk politics', the so-called 'politics of governors'. Paulistas and Mineiros rotate the federal executive for 28 years of the 36 years of the civilian controlled Old Republic. Minas Gerais elite shares national power with the hegemonic 'Paulista' coffee elite. Political participation restricted a bare fraction of the population. Electoral fraud.
	1889- 1891	Government Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca (Alagoas).
	1891- 1894	Government Marshal Floriano Peixoto (Alagoas)
	1894- 1898	Government Prudente de Moraes (Sao Paulo). The first civilian to become president
	1897	Attack against Canudos rebellion killing thousands of people in the Northeast of Bahia
	1898-1902	Campos Sales government. Other president from Sao Paulo. Emergence of the 'politics of governors' to strengthen regional oligarchies
	1902- 1906	Government Rodrigues Alves (Rio de Janeiro). The most popular and admired president of the Old Republic.
	1904	Rodrigues Alves' Sanitary Reform. Obligatory vaccination causes popular manifestations in Rio de Janeiro- 'Revolta da Vacina'.
	1906- 1909	Government Afonso Pena (Minas Gerais). This seals the politics coffee and milk of power rotation between the states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais. Vice-President- Nilo Pecanha.
	1909- 1910	President Afonso Pena dies. Nilo Pecanha (Rio de Janeiro) assumes office.

		Moment of great mobilisation around the presidential campaign of Rui Barbosa and Marshal Hermes da Fonseca. With his 'civilist campaign', Rui Barbosa fights for the return of the military to the barracks and the strengthening of civilian power.
	1910-1914	Government Marshal Hermes da Fonseca (Rio de Janeiro). Fraudulent election.
	1914- 1918	Government Venceslau Bras (Minas Gerais) Contestado War, a land dispute between Parana and Santa Catarina. During five years of war died twenty thousand people. Canudos War is repressed by the government ending in 1916 with a pact.
	1918-1919	Government Delfim Moreira (Minas Gerais). He dies before taking the office, in January 1919. Substituted by his Vice-President.
	1919-1922	Government Epitacio Pessoa (Rio de Janeiro). The president closes down the Military Club because of conspiracy.
	7-7-1922	'Os 18 do Forte', Military School Riot. Liutenants confront legalist forces in Copacabana , Rio de Janeiro. Marshal Hermes da Fonseca is sent to prison. The president declares a state of siege ' <i>estado de sitio</i> '
	1922- 1926	Government Artur Bernardes (Minas Gerais). Serious crises. Antipathy of the people and the Army. Revolution of 1923, in Rio Grande do Sul. Revolution of 1924, in Sao Paulo. Government fights against military rebels 'antibernardistas'. Legalist forces bomb Sao Paulo during one month. The revolutionary Prestes Column crosses the country during three years.
	1926 -1930	Government Washington Luis (Sao Paulo). Intensive construction of mortorways. The president indicates Julio Prestes (Sao Paulo) as his official candidate for the next elections against Getulio Vargas (Rio Grande do Sul). Julio Prestes win the elections but under the allegation of fraud.
1930- 1945 The Vargas Era		The 1930 'Revolution' deposes the Paulista president and delivers power to Getulio Vargas of Rio Grande do Sul. Strengthening of the central State. End of the oligarchy's monopoly over the State

		and politics. Incorporation of new classes and sectors into the political system.
	1930- 1934	Provisory Government Dissolution of Congress
	30-10-1930	Governative 'Junta'
	03 - 12 -1930	Getulio Vargas assumes office as Chief of Government of the Brazilian Republic
	1932	Sao Paulo Rebellion
	1937-1945	Dictatorship of Getulio Vargas 'The New State'
1945- 1964 Democratic Era 'Experiment in Democracy' (Skidmore, 1967) Restoration of competitive elections. Expanding electorate. Elite dominated political system.		
	1945	Restoration of Democracy by means of an Adicional Act Getulio Vargas convokes direct elections for president in 28-02-1945
	16-09-1946	New Constitution is issued
	1946-1950	General Eurico Gaspar Dutra(PSD) Government
	July/1950	Law n. 1.164 issued to regulate electoral propaganda in the media
	1950- 1954	Getulio Vargas Government
	24-08-1954	Getulio Vargas commits suicide
	1955-1960	Juscelino Kubitschek Government
	1960	Television licensing becomes an exclusive power of the President
	1961	Code of Communication is issued
	August/1962	Law 4.115 establishes Free Air Time on radio and television, still permitting paid electoral propaganda in the mass media
1964- 1985 Military Dictatorship	1964	Military Coup- 'Revolution' of 1964
	1964-1967	General Castello Branco Administration
	1965	Globo Network began
	1969-1969	General Costa e Silva Administration

	1968	Creation of the Ministry of Communication staffed with military personnel
	1969	Country receives simultaneous transmission of television through national networks
	1970--1974	General Garrastazu Medici Administration
1974-1985 Democratic transition	1974- 1979	General Geisel Administration
	1974	Elections. MDB, opposition party, conquers 60% of popular vote. Arena loses seats in Congress and Senate. Defeat of the Military regime
	1974	Colour television was available
	August/1974	Free Air Time is prohibited by Law n.6.091
	July/ 1976	Falcao Law (Lei Falcao) strict censorship on the media until 1982 in order to retain oppositions growth . Free Air Time is re-established in a new censored format.
	1978	Elections. Arena (government party) recovers seats in Congress.
	1979-1985	General Figueiredo Administration
	1979	National Amnesty
	1982	Reintroduction of direct election for state governors. MDB conquers key stategovernments/
	1983	New television licensees: Silvio Santos, Grupo Capital, Bloch Editora, Evangelical Minister Pastor Fanini
	April/1984	Diretas Ja Campaign Direct Elections for President Now
	1985	Civilian regime extends suffrage to illiterates.
	January/1985-	The PMDB-PFL coalition 'Alianca Democratica' win in the Electoral College but Tancredo Neves dies before taking office
	1985- 1989	Government Jose Sarney (Maranhao), first civilian government of the post-authoritarian era. Precarious legitimacy.
	February/1986	Cruzado Plan I
	1988	Collapse of Cruzado Plan. Slow down in process of consolidating mass democratic convictions.
	1988	Crafting of a New Constitution
	1988	Constitution endorses re-democratisation of party propaganda on radio and television giving back the right to free access to the media
	1989	Free Presidential Elections
	1989-1992	Government Fernando Collor de Mello (Alagoas)

	1992	Collor de Mello impeachment
	1992-1994	Government Itamar Franco (Minas Gerais)
	1994	Electoral Law n. 8.713 creates restrictions to television format of Free Air-Time to combat fraud and manipulation.
	1994	Free Presidential Elections
	1994-1998	Government Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Sao Paulo)

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Introduction

Continuity and Innovation: Television and New forms of Conciliation in Brazilian Politics.

The main claim in this investigation concerns the role the mass media, and particularly television, play in contemporary Brazil. In my opinion, the electronic media that has supposedly tended to safeguard traditional politics has obstructed the establishment of full democracy in Brazil over the last thirty years. Since the 1960s a quasi-monopoly of political communication, instituted during the military regime has fulfilled a mediatory role between government and the people. In so doing, it played a central role in constructing a project of national integration whilst also excluding protest and popular antagonism. Today, the mass media still combine the two opposing forces of innovation and conservation and this perpetuates tension in the political system. On one hand, the mass media broadens social demands, including the endorsement of political competitiveness, whilst on the other hand, it constrains heterogeneous social and political movements. It is the aim of this thesis to investigate precisely how television has succeeded in playing this dual role.

In Brazil these divergent trends manifest themselves through the paradoxical co-existence of both modern and traditional orders. The political machinery, institutions and procedures adopted appear as modern: formally organised along rational and democratic principles. Underneath this, however, remains a highly traditional mentality that ultimately supports and perpetuates the social and political power of the ruling oligarchies. The electronic media form the link that keeps these two opposing orders functioning simultaneously. In short, it permits the old order to persist and even flourish within the new, therefore emphasising the values of traditionalism and assisting the control of social tensions. Television in Brazil functions as a means of stabilising meaning and is consequently an instrument of political stability since it harmonises a controlled re-democratisation with the expanding consumer-market.

The manner in which television networks constrain political communication deserves close attention since Brazil presents a unique situation in which a commercial network enjoys

extraordinary popularity among a population of 161.8 million. Political communication through television reaches a market of 37,759,134 television households where 4.9 people share every television.¹ This figure is smaller than some other South American countries² but none of these are affected by a powerful television structure like the Brazilian Globo Network that captures on a regular basis the highest audiences in the world.³ In January 1998, the Globo Network soap operas reached 37/59 household rating/shares or an audience of 23,410,663. TV Globo also normally reaches 34/58 or 21,900,297 with its news night, 'National Journal' (*Jornal Nacional*).⁴ Given that newspaper circulation is low in relation to other countries, it must be assumed that most people acquire their information about national politics from TV programmes. In this respect Brazil is no different from Western European democracies where newspaper circulation is considerably higher.⁵ Empirical research has long since confirmed that for most people in the European Community (EC) the electronic media are also the major source of information about world events and political affairs.⁶ However, the point I want to make here is that Brazilians who rely on the electronic media,

¹ It is true that television set ownership in Brazil is not as high as in the United Kingdom, Japan or the United States, but this is not the point since I am focusing on the influence of television in the Brazilian society. In this context not everyone can afford a television set as opposed to rich countries where according to Eurostat's Directorate for Social and Regional Statistics and Structural Plans, in 1991, over 90% of European households owned at least one television. The figures for Italy (100%) and United Kingdom (98%) are the highest in Europe. See *Social Portrait of Europe* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996), p. 231. See also notes to this introduction, 'Television Set Ownership in the World'.

² According to UNESCO, the South American countries with the highest number of television receivers per 1,000 inhabitants in 1994 were Argentina (219), Chile (211) and Brazil (209). Notwithstanding, we must consider other indicators to understand why television plays a crucial role in the Brazilian society. First, the Brazilian population read less than in the two other mentioned countries. The circulation of daily newspapers per 1,000 inhabitants is 138 in Argentina, 100 in Chile and 45 in Brazil. Second, the people watch more television in Brazil given the high adult illiteracy rates of 16.7% well above of illiteracy rates in Argentina (3.8%) and Chile (4.8%). See *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1996* (US, UNESCO Publishing & Bernan Press, 1997), pp. 1-4 for further details.

³ The Globo Network owns 107 channels that broadcast to 83.61% of the 4,159 Brazilian municipalities. It reaches 94.21% of the Brazilian population (i.e. 152.431.178 people) and 96.48% of households with television sets. The Globo Network presents an IPC (Potential Consume Index) of 96.536% of the market. Considering the usage of satellite the numbers jump to almost 100% reaching 4,950 municipalities (99.52%), 161.080.257 of the population (99.90%), with an IPC of 99.940%. Source: *Rede Globo 30 anos: uma historia ilustrada*, (São Paulo, Globo, 1996), p. 7. and *TV Globo - Cobertura Brasil*, <http://sucom.redeglobo.com.br/ats/capa.htm>.

Considering not only the scope of coverage but also the television market, the mass media in Brazil reveal a very uneven distribution. In 1996 the national market concerning audience share was divided as follows: 65% TV Globo, 16% SBT, 5% TV Manchete, 5% TV Bandeirantes, 9% others. For further details see Appendix to Introduction: 'Television in Brazil'.

⁴ See Appendix to Introduction - 'Top Ranked Brazilian Television Broadcasts' - 'TV Globo's Top Ranked Programmes' for December/97 and January/98. See also audience research published by SBT (Sistema Brasileiro de Televisão).

⁵ See Appendix to Introduction - Table 5: 'Main Sources of Political Information', p.4.

⁶ For further reading see R. Negrine, *Politics and the Mass Media in Britain*, (London, Routledge, 1989) pp.1-2; D.Watts, *Political Communication Today*, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1997) , pp.72-3; C.Seymour-Ure, *The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945*, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1991,1996), pp.165-9 and Euro-Barometer (1989) 31-A 'Mass communication as a source of political information amongst members of the

not newspapers, to get political information, have a higher adult illiteracy rate of 16.7% than in Argentina (3.8%) and Chile (4.8%) and that is just using South America as an example.⁷ Considering that in any democracy, support for government policies tends to be greatest among moderately sophisticated citizens,⁸ whereas the most resistant to persuasion seem to be people who are highly attentive to politics and are predisposed against authoritarianism. This particular combination between non-sophisticated citizens, authoritarian governments and a mass media filled with pro-government propaganda is the crucial point that makes Brazilian television different from that in Western Europe. Brazilian television, seen as a repressive means, tends to extirpate independent criticism and analysis while shaping political attitudes and attenuating antagonisms dividing Brazilian society.

Perpetuating Traditional Power Structures

Oligarchic power and clientelistic practices are characteristic of traditional Brazilian politics. Clientelistic mediation between state and society organises consent assuring the survival of a traditional political elite that has persisted in Brazil through a series of regimes. Today, political power continues to be narrowly concentrated, access to decision making is restricted, channels of political representation are organised hierarchically and along territorial rather than class or ethnic lines. In the postauthoritarian political system, traditional politicians still retain considerable power in the state governments maintaining control of patronage as their most important political resource.

The traditional political system in Brazil has accommodated itself to change by developing new forms of control such as a conciliatory discourse articulated by a television that is modern and traditional at the same time. Despite being highly creative and culturally independent, the Brazilian

European Community' in *Opinião Pública* (Campinas, CESOP/UNICAMP, 1995, Vol.III, n.2), p.12.

⁷ J. Straubhaar; O. Olsen; M.C.Nunes, 'The Brazilian Case: Influencing the Voter' in T. Skidmore, *Television, Politics, and the Transition to Democracy in Latin America*, (Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp.127, Table 7.2, has presented evidence about the relationship between information sources and levels of education in Brazil. As the authors note (p.123), the IBOPE survey (October/1989) confirmed the dominance of television as a source of political information showing however television as 'a part of a complex environment in which personal and organisational sources mediate information, and personal sources

media promote the repetition of a traditional power structure pervaded by *clientelism* and *patronage*, legitimising a semi-democratic consensus that is relatively fragile compared with other countries with a democratic tradition. In order to understand the underlying logic that explains the mass media's conservative function, I refer to mechanisms of power that historically provided the bases for political continuity in Brazil. My argument is that the ways in which the media reproduce this conservative order are not new. On the contrary, consensual strategies have been identified and demonstrated in previous analyses of the state and intellectual accounts of political behaviour since the beginning of the century.

Brazilian history has been characterised by a liberal-conservative and capitalist hegemony set out to avoid change and the 'evils of universal democracy'. Authors such as Buarque de Holanda (1936), Faoro (1958), Uricoechea (1978) and Schwartzman (1970) argue from a Weberian perspective that the representation of interests in Brazil evolved from a patrimonial ideal type of domination that entails a slow expansion of the state's power. A patrimonial type of state, a distributor of public benefits, ends up permeating the society and encompassing all classes via *coronelism*,⁹ *mandonism*,¹⁰ *clientelism*¹¹ and *populism*¹² that guarantee support for the state. Costa Porto (1951), Nunes Leal (1948), Pereira de Queiroz (1969), Blondel (1957), Pang (1973), Wirth (1977) and Cintra (1979) explain these mechanisms of power through which since the 18th century,

complement the dominance of television news?

⁸ See chapter 4 'exposure-acceptance model' (Geddes & Zaller, 1989:321).

⁹ *Coronelism* is a political compromise that was first proposed by Victor Nunes Leal (1948). The concept of *coronelism* refers to a political system and more specifically to a political fact: the implantation of federalism after the proclamation of republic in 1889. The end of imperial centralism has given rise to the 'colonel' as a new political actor incarnated by state governors who enjoyed extensive powers until 1930. For this reason, *coronelism* is a historical phenomenon. It consists of a complex network of relations that extend from colonel to president. It explains how, during the First Republic (1889-1930), power relations in Brazil developed from the municipal level to a central level, involving reciprocal compromises.

¹⁰ *Mandonism* refers to the existence of local bosses. The latter are taken as the basis of personalised and oligarchic structures of power. The boss controls strategic resources such as land ownership, exercising personal and arbitrary domination over the people. This sort of personal domination impedes the free access of people to political society.

¹¹ *Clientelism* is a growing political relation in Brazil linked to the necessity of the electoral basis of political parties. According to Carvalho (1997) *clientelism* has increased with the decadence of colonels' direct control over local voters. A clientelistic relation develops between politicians and poor sectors of the population that exchange their votes for jobs and public services. Electoral loyalty is seen as compensation for a series of services a deputy may offer to the community. *Clientelism* is a bargain closely related with *coronelism* and *mandonism*. However, recent studies reveal a fall in *clientelistic* relations insofar as the poor population began to accept favours from several parties, receiving the benefits but not feeling obliged to be faithful to any of the donors. This way, party investments in television marketing seem a more profitable and secure method of securing votes.

¹² *Populism's* main ideology is that virtue is lodged in the authentic people. The *populist* discourse excludes the

great colonels enjoyed political power. I argue that *coronelism* and *clientelism* as a means of controlled insertion into the political community have parallels with television discourse as mediator in a vertically organised, hierarchical system of domination. As with the *coronel* in the first Republic, the political potential of television networks is measured by their power of electoral bargaining that induces popular vote. The typical *clientelistic* relation characterised by a personalised and particularised relation between patron and client is also reproduced in the mass media. The latter repeat old formulae by maintaining a relation that is founded in the exchange of symbolic resources rather than material resources. Using traditional strategies, television integrates different economic and social strata characterised by large differences in power and resources, these traditional mechanisms discussed in chapter 3, are absorbed and extended by the mass media in Brazil.

The Unconventional divide of Public Opinion in Brazil

Despite the influence of traditional and modern mechanisms of power that postpone the constitution of radical political differences in Brazil, public opinion is not monolithic or homogeneous in this society. However, as I explain in chapter 4, notions of progressive and non-progressive do not overlap the classical concept of left and right in Western democracies. The Brazilian working class supports democratic values and at the same time advocates non-democratic alternatives. This problem is researched through empirical analysis of political behaviour in Brazil by Rochon and Mitchell (1989) Von Mettenheim (1990) Moisés (1995) Echegaray (1996) and Barquero (1996) and Geddes & Zaller (1989). One of their main conclusions about the lack of political protest in Brazil is that political information is possibly among the factors that bridge incongruent positions between notions of democracy through the representation of a traditional order. The quasi-monopoly of mass communication plays an important role as a modern mechanism of consensual power that assists the blurring of radical opposition between Brazilian voters.

class struggle and can be defined as the type of discourse whose principal inception is a social homogeneous aggregate retaining positive value.

Mediatory Conciliation

A quasi-monopoly of political communication in Brazil, instituted during the military regime, played a central part in a negotiated opening or democratic transition by performing a necessary *mediatory conciliation* between government and the people. This mediation, fulfilled by television, guaranteed the development of two opposing tendencies: the broadening of social demands, including the valorisation of political competitiveness, whilst also constraining heterogeneous social and political movements. Television limited threats to the continuity of traditional oligarchies' domination by controlling any social explosion.

An important aspect of Brazilian television has been the displacement of political struggle into a struggle of meaning, pleasure and fetishism. Brazilian media networks employ techniques of electoral manipulation with integrative effects that disperse and demobilise society, contributing to the attenuation of conflicts of interests and ethic-religious fragmentation. This repression of contest, that is investigated in chapter 5, takes place through the seemingly democratic character of television that mirrors society by showing a wide range of popular dramas that appear to satisfy certain symbolic necessities of a people that do not feel represented in the congress. If it were not for television, these excluded people would not be taken into account by any other channel of power.

From the perspective of its social functions, the media are centralised systems that serve very diversified types of clientele who are co-opted and consist of broad and diversified urban groups composing 75,47% of the Brazilian population. Nobody loses in the new clientelistic game because actors, who benefit symbolically but not directly, do not perceive the effects of television's co-optation as harmful. The non-detrimental character of the new *clientelistic* practices enable the enlargement of the mass media hegemony that, as with 'political party machines', is always able to diversify its action encompassing larger clienteles, constantly maintaining the segmentation of their interests. Like the old *clientelism*, the new type diverts attention from the most acute social tensions, diluting horizontal bonds of solidarity between members of different groups of interest.

Mediatory conciliation that is accomplished today by Brazilian television has been a key element in the ideological building of Brazilian conservatism from independence in 1822 to the New Republic in the 1990s. As I argue in chapter 3, accommodation and compromise among hierarchically organised social groups that is given credence by the mass media have historically shaped the Brazilian imaginary through discursive constructions elaborated since the first half of the 20th century by intellectuals sustaining an authoritative-normative discourse. Nowadays the mass media still contribute to the construction of a traditional identity as irrational and apathetic but also orderly, peaceful and harmonious.

Object of Analysis

This dissertation concentrates on the role performed by television in Brazil regarding both its institutional and cultural perspectives, with special attention to rhetorical strategies characterising political party broadcasts and manifestos during the electoral campaigns of 1989 and 1994. In order to situate my empirical analysis of party proclamations in the context of the Brazilian mass media, in Chapter 5 I investigate some aspects of the political atmosphere constructed by political communication, paying special attention to the narrative structures of TV Globo's soap operas. I also examine television's licensing system, state control, and electoral laws regulating the use of television by political parties.

My new and original analysis developed in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis studies the 1989 and 1994 presidential campaigns with special attention to the PSDB -*Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (centre-left) and the PT - *Partido dos Trabalhadores* 'Worker's Party' (Socialist). I have codified electoral broadcasts and manifestos of these two specific parties since over the last ten years they have represented the main hegemonic forces emerging to the left of the Brazilian political spectrum and were therefore, potential movements of change challenging the traditional power structure. Conversely the main motive to analyse the PSDB's proclamations is that this party underwent an ideological shift from 1989 to 1994. In the first round of the 1989 presidential elections Mario Covas (PSDB), representative of the only party situated on the centre-

left, received 11.52% of the valid votes. In the 1994 presidential election, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) captured 54,28% of the votes, by representing the conservative elites. So, while it must be noted that the PSDB itself was not a right-wing party, it became increasingly representative of the centre-right wing coalition between the PSDB, PFL, PTB and the PL during 1994.

Methodology

My main contribution in this thesis consists of the creation of two new methodologies (explained in Chapter 2 and applied in Chapter 6) that enable me to contrast political strategies in party manifestos on one hand and broadcasts on the other. The reason of contrasting manifestos and broadcasts is to investigate changes that party proclamations undergo when adapting to television. My methodologies concentrate on mimetic convergence and rhetorical strategies of persuasion and study the influence of television on communication strategies, testing the hypothesis that Brazilian television performs a conservative role since it prevents adversarial politics.

My first methodology enables the study of 'mimetic convergence' between party broadcasts and manifestos and analyses political proclamations from a dynamic perspective, questioning the interference of public opinion on ideological re-orientations. My second methodology, which is applied to a comparative study of the 1989 and 1994 presidential campaigns, permits the observation of three rhetorical strategies of persuasion: the *institutionalising* or primary discourse, the *mobilising* or secondary discourse and the *oppositional* or tertiary discourse. By *mobilisation* I mean a discursive construction that divides the political camp, creates chains of equivalence, but not that of emancipation, by *demobilisation* I mean a discourse that seeks not to divide but to keep differences as they are. Finally, by *oppositional* I mean a strategy that tries to deny or annihilate other discourses.

The general categories of *mobilising* and *institutionalising* strategies in political argumentation form an alternative way of viewing political discourses from the perspective of discourse theory. These are contrasted with a traditional content analysis, which explores the emphasis on traditional issues in party manifestos. In chapter 6 I show that *mobilisation* and

demobilisation strategies are both highly dependent upon the secondary type of discourse that shows a unifying effect.

The use of this methodology helped me to provide evidence, for example, that from 1989 to 1994, PSDB's shift from centre-left to the right-wing was followed by an increase in PSDB's *mobilising* or secondary rhetoric on television, whereas, in written manifestos there was an increase in *institutionalising* or primary rhetoric. These tendencies were different for the Socialist PT - Workers' Party, which from 1989 to 1994 PT presented an increase in a tertiary rhetoric or antagonistic discourse in its political broadcasts.

Theoretical framework

In the analysis of television political proclamations I employ categories drawn from discourse analysis, linguistic theory, communication theory and deconstruction as discussed in Chapter 1. To explain the mechanisms of power that secure the reproduction of political conservatism throughout Brazilian history, and also constitute the bases of political communication, I adopt discourse theory as a framework capable of elucidating the logic underlying the continuity of traditional domination. Using Derrida and Laclau's discourse theory as a framework, I develop the proposition that the electronic media contributes to the non-adversarial dynamics of politics weakening the possibilities of drawing clear-cut frontiers. The infrastructural logic of iterability in Derrida is deployed to explain how, even while allowing a degree of innovation, television still functions to conserve a traditional order. The hegemonic logic developed in the work of Laclau explains the endurance of a conservative discourse as result of the domination of the field of discursivity and arresting of the flow of differences. Continuity, in respect to the hegemonic logic, is the expansion of a traditional discourse into a dominant horizon of social reconciliation or adjustment, by means of the articulation of unpredictable elements into partially fixed moments. The logic of hegemony gives an account of the process of disarticulation of the Brazilian society and the rearticulation of an illusion of fullness that aims to establish and conserve the political, moral and intellectual leadership by traditional elites.