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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
We describe a theoretical model aiming to discuss the welfare implications of different institutional architectures, varying from complete centralised political choices to different degrees of subnational political autonomy. By voting citizens express preferences regarding the desired political decision level. Citizens’ preferences can cover a variety of aspects, from environmental protection to public goods provision. The subnational political autonomy proposed in the model can assume two forms: The implementation of isolated communities or definition of a region. A trade-off between cost-sharing provision of public provision and the loss that results from sharing it with individuals holding different preferences is widely pondered. This model allows us to conclude that in the absence of inter-community compensatory transfers and in the presence of a unanimity voting system, citizens’ voice, stability and efficiency conditions are only guaranteed when citizens are completely segregated into homogenous communities or when there is a centralised political regime.
Description
Keywords
Citizens’ preferences Political choices Public finance Fiscal federalism