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The role of social and technical excludability for the success of impure public good and common pool agreements

dc.contributor.authorFinus, Michael
dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Raoul
dc.contributor.authorPintassilgo, Pedro
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-14T11:07:11Z
dc.date.available2020-04-14T11:07:11Z
dc.date.issued2020-02
dc.description.abstractWe argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the incentive structure of forming impure public good and common pool agreements. We consider a fully integrated multiple zone model, in which zones are linked through density-dependent migration. The incentive to accede to Regional Fishery Management Organizations (RFMOs) is related to multiple characteristics. Firstly, the relative patch sizes of the high seas, which is the internationally (publicly) accessible domain, compared to exclusive economic zones, which are state-owned (privately owned). This can be related to the degree of socially constructed excludability. Secondly, the intensity of fish migration between various zones, which can be related to the degree of technical excludability. Thirdly, the growth rate of the resource, which can be interpreted as the degree of rivalry, with a low (high) degree of rivalry approximating public good (common pool) features. We show that, generally, excludability reduces free-riding incentives but also the need for cooperation, a variant of the "paradox of cooperation". Moreover, we show that the benefit-cost duality between public goods and common pool resources generally holds except for some extreme parameter values for which a low degree of rivalry fosters the success of cooperation. Finally, through a variation of the diffusion matrix, we can also analyze a closed as well as a sink-source system. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.pt_PT
dc.description.sponsorshipPortuguese Foundation for Science and Technology UID/ECO/04007/2019pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2019.101122pt_PT
dc.identifier.issn0928-7655
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.1/13706
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.publisherElsevierpt_PT
dc.relationCenter for Advanced Studies in Management and Economics
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765517302580?via%3Dihubpt_PT
dc.subjectPure and impure public goods and common pool resourcesTechnical and socially constructed non-excludabilityBenefit-cost duality of public goods and common pool resourcespt_PT
dc.subjectTechnical and socially constructed non-excludabilitypt_PT
dc.subjectBenefit-cost duality of public goods and common pool resourcespt_PT
dc.subjectProperty rightspt_PT
dc.subjectShared fish stockspt_PT
dc.subjectRegional fisheries management organizationspt_PT
dc.subjectFree-ridingpt_PT
dc.titleThe role of social and technical excludability for the success of impure public good and common pool agreementspt_PT
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.awardTitleCenter for Advanced Studies in Management and Economics
oaire.awardURIinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/6817 - DCRRNI ID/UID%2FECO%2F04007%2F2019/PT
oaire.citation.startPage101122pt_PT
oaire.citation.titleResource and Energy Economicspt_PT
oaire.citation.volume59pt_PT
oaire.fundingStream6817 - DCRRNI ID
person.familyNamePintassilgo
person.givenNamePedro
person.identifier.ciencia-id0915-956B-B8D3
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-9115-4301
person.identifier.scopus-author-id16402577500
project.funder.identifierhttp://doi.org/10.13039/501100001871
project.funder.nameFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typearticlept_PT
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryc4dae0e0-dafe-4a63-b30b-cf4f0b3deac3
relation.isProjectOfPublicationb118b89f-05d2-4bf8-9d91-4a6d8bc25daa
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