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Resumo(s)
Monte-Carlo simulations were used to describe the interactions between cellular automata, socio-economic ‘agents’, in society. In a first simulation we repeat work in literature of a system of independent agents. We repeat the finding that the strongest agent will confiscate all wealth. In a second simulation we show how agents can prevent against such theft, or steal better, by joining forces. So-called join-believe fight (joining, believing unquestionably in the narrative of the faction, and fighting other factions). We now take cooperations between factions of joined agents into account. The final outcome is that society obliterates libertarians (those that are reluctant to join forces) and winds up in a situation in which all surviving agents are joined in a single faction. However, it is reasoned that then fights within this single faction will start, since this end situation resembles the starting point of entire society; the single faction has become entire society and the game recommences. It is a snake that bites its own tail and goes around forever attacking.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Monte-Carlo simulations Social hierarchy Cooperation World government
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Editora
Springer