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Abstract(s)
Finance literature suggests that financial analysts are sophisticated agents that act
as facilitators of market efficiency by releasing relevant information to the market. This paper uses a sample of four major US bankruptcies to explore if analysts are able to disclose information to the market that provides investors with material information for their investment decisions. In particular, we use a qualitative approach to analyse analysts’ reports in order to verify if these agents are able to predict financial and strategic bankruptcies before the event is publicly known. We also investigate how financial analysts react to bankruptcy shortly after it has become effective. Results show that investors cannot rely on analysts’ reports to anticipate corporate failure in both the case of financial and strategic bankruptcies. Our results also suggest that analysts react asymmetrically to strategic and financial bankruptcies shortly after this event is publicly known.
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Keywords
Analysts’ reports financial analysts strategic bankruptcy financial bankruptcy